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Abstract
We study the design of iterative combinatorial auctions for
domains with a large number of items. In such domains, pref-
erence elicitation is a major challenge because the bundle
space grows exponentially in the number of items. To keep
preference elicitation manageable, recent work has employed
a machine learning (ML) algorithm that identifies a small set
of bundles to query from each bidder. However, a major lim-
itation of this prior work is that bidders must submit exact
values for the queried bundles, which can be quite costly for
them. To address this, we propose a new ML-powered auction
with interval bidding (i.e., where bidders submit upper and
lower bounds for the queried bundles). To steer the auction
towards an efficient allocation, we design a price-based re-
finement process asking bidders to tighten bounds on relevant
bundles only, and we carefully integrate this refinement pro-
cess into the ML-based query module. Our experiments show
that our new auction with interval bidding achieves almost the
same allocative efficiency as the prior auction design that re-
quired bidders to submit exact values. Despite only eliciting
interval bids, our auction beats the well-known combinatorial
clock auction in a realistically-sized domain.
1 Introduction
Combinatorial auctions (CAs) are used to allocate a set of
heterogeneous items to multiple bidders in domains where
items may be viewed as substitutes or complements. In CAs,
bidders can submit bids on bundles rather than just individ-
ual items to express their preferences. Therefore, CAs avoid
the exposure problem where bidders bid more than their true
value for an item to express complementarity and might end
up with a negative utility. CAs are widely used in practice,
e.g., for industrial procurement (Sandholm 2013) and for the
allocation of TV-ad slots (Goetzendorf et al. 2015).
While using CAs resolves the exposure problem, a new
problem arises. The bundle space grows exponentially in
the number of items, which makes it impractical to explore
and report the complete value function, even in medium-
sized domains. Therefore, iterative combinatorial auctions
(ICAs) are often used in practice, where the auctioneer in-
teracts with the bidders over the course of multiple rounds
and only elicits a limited amount of information. A prime
example is the combinatorial clock auction (CCA), which
has already been used for more than 15 auctions and has
generated more than $15 Billion since 2008 (Ausubel and
Baranov 2017). It has been used to conduct spectrum auc-
tions (Cramton 2013) and to auction off the right to build
offshore wind farms (Ausubel and Cramton 2011).
To keep the CCA practical, it uses simple per-item prices
in the first phase of the auction, and it limits the number of
bids that can be submitted in the second phase of the auction.
For example, in the 2014 Canadian spectrum auction (with
98 goods), bidders could only submit up to 500 bids, which
is a tiny fraction of the whole bundle space. But these sim-
plifications are not without loss. As Scheffel, Ziegler, and
Bichler (2012) and Bichler, Shabalin, and Wolf (2013) have
shown, bidders tend to focus on only a small number of bun-
dles early in the auction instead of considering the full bun-
dle space, which can lead to large efficiency losses.
1.1 ML-powered ICAs with Exact Bidding
To address these problems with the CCA, Brero, Lu-
bin, and Seuken (2018, 2020) introduced a new machine
learning-powered iterative combinatorial auction (MLCA).
MLCA drives the elicitation process via a machine learning-
powered query module (instead of using prices). This query
module uses support vector regression (SVR) to learn bid-
ders’ non-linear value functions, aiding the auction to iden-
tify which value queries to ask in each round. Importantly,
the authors have shown that MLCA outperforms the CCA in
terms of efficiency in a large, realistically-sized auction do-
main. More recently, Weissteiner and Seuken (2020) showed
how to use neural networks (NNs) in place of SVRs inside
MLCA, which can increase its efficiency even further.
However, a major limitation of MLCA is that it requires
“exact bidding,” i.e., bidders must report exact values for
all queried bundles. In practice, this can be very costly for
bidders (Parkes 2001). For example, determining the value
of even a single bundle typically requires bidders to solve
a complex resource allocation and profit optimization prob-
lem (Parkes 2006). In some auctions (e.g., for oil drilling
rights), it may even be practically impossible to report ex-
act values, because there is inherent uncertainty about the
value of the resources, which cannot be resolved before the
auction (Oren and Williams 1975).
1.2 Our Contribution: iMLCA
To address the difficulty of reporting exact values for bun-
dles, we propose a new ML-powered ICA with interval bid-
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ding (iMLCA). iMLCA enables bidders to express uncer-
tainty about their values for a given bundle, by asking them
to report a upper and lower bounds on their values (instead
of exact values). While we take the MLCA mechanism by
(Brero, Lubin, and Seuken 2020) as the starting point for our
design, we modify and extend it in multiple ways to properly
handle the new interval queries.
The main challenge is that, if the intervals are sufficiently
large, it may be difficult or impossible for the auctioneer
to still determine a highly efficient allocation as well as
payments. Therefore, we design a price-based refinement
process that asks bidders to tighten some of their reported
bounds in each auction round, extending earlier work on
refinement processes by Lubin et al. (2008). Our technical
contribution here is a new price generation objective (Proce-
dure 4), for which we prove that it reduces bidder effort, i.e.,
it leads to fewer refinement requests (Section 4.4).
Our main contribution in this paper is the design of a new
auction phase (phase 2 of iMLCA), where we carefully in-
tegrate the ML-powered query module designed by Brero,
Lubin, and Seuken (2020) with our new price-based refine-
ment process into the same auction round (Section 3.2). This
allows us to keep the number of auction rounds relatively
small. Finally, we also design a second auction phase, where
we perform a refinement process with convergence guaran-
tees, which guarantees that the final bounds will be tight
enough to determine the efficient allocation (Section 3.3).
To evaluate iMLCA, we use the spectrum auction test
suite (SATS) (Weiss, Lubin, and Seuken 2017), which al-
lows us to generate synthetic CA instances. We compare
iMLCA against the original MLCA and the CCA. Our
main finding is that iMLCA achieves almost the same ef-
ficiency as MLCA, while still using a small number of auc-
tion rounds. Importantly, we show that iMLCA achieves this
high efficiency, while revealing much less information than
in MLCA (which we measure in terms of the uncertainty
that is left at the end of the auction). Finally, we show that,
in the realistically-sized MRVM domain, iMLCA even out-
performs the CCA in terms of efficiency. This suggests that
iMLCA may be an attractive alternative design for conduct-
ing large ICAs in practice.
1.3 Related Work
Lahaie and Parkes (2004) and Blum et al. (2004) were
the first to use machine learning (ML) to improve prefer-
ence elicitation. Since then, one strand of research has used
ML for automated mechanism design (Du¨tting et al. 2015;
Golowich, Narasimhan, and Parkes 2018; Du¨tting et al.
2019). This approach differs from ours, in that it uses ML to
learn the whole mechanism. The work by Brero and Lahaie
(2018) and Brero, Lahaie, and Seuken (2019) follows a de-
sign paradigm more similir to our ours (integrating ML into
the auction), but it designs a Bayesian price-based mecha-
nism, where the main goal is to improve the convergence
speed of the auction.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we present our formal model and provide a
high-level summary of the MLCA mechanism.
2.1 Formal Model
CAs allocate m indivisible items among n bidders. We let
M = {1, ...,m} denote the set of items and N = {1, ..., n}
the set of bidders. Bundles of items are represented by an
indicator vector x ∈ X = {0, 1}m, i.e., xj = 1 iff item
j ∈M is contained in bundle x. Each bidder i’s preferences
are captured by a true private value function denoted as vi :
X → R≥0. Without loss we assume that the value functions
are normalized such that the value of the empty bundle is
zero and impose no further structural restrictions. We let v =
(v1, ..., vn) denote the value profile across all bidders.
Typically, we consider the main economy, i.e., the set
of all bidders n. In this case, an allocation is denoted by
a = (a1, ..., an) ∈ Xn, where ai is the bundle allo-
cated to bidder i. We denote the set of feasible alloca-
tions by F = {a ∈ Xn : ∑i∈N aij ≤ 1, ∀j ∈M}. Some-
times we will need to work with a marginal economy,
where a single bidder j is omitted. In this case we de-
note the allocation in the marginal economy by a(−i) =
(a
(−i)
1 , . . . , a
(−i)
i−1 , a
(−i)
i+1 , . . . , a
(−i)
n ), where the superscript
indicates which bidder has been omitted in the optimization,
and the subscript selects a particular bidder’s bundle from
the profile of bundles in the allocation.
We will need to work with value profiles other than
the truthful one. For any such profile v′, we let v′(a) =∑
i vi(ai) denote the total value of allocation a. When the
true value profile is used, this quantity is called the social
welfare of the allocation. The allocation that maximizes the
social welfare is a∗ ∈ arg maxa∈F v(a).
Our mechanism will charge payments which we denote
by p = (p1, ..., pn), where pi is the payment of bidder
i. We assume quasi-linear utilities of the form ui(a, p) =
vi(ai) − pi. We design social welfare-maximizing mecha-
nisms and measure the efficiency of any a ∈ F as Eff(a) =
v(a)/v(a∗). Relative revenue is measured as the total pay-
ment relative to the maximal social welfare
∑
i pi/v(a
∗).
For our new mechanism, we define an interval query as
a generalization of a value query, but where reports spec-
ify upper and lower bounds rather than exact values. Ac-
cordingly, the kth bundle-value report of bidder i is denoted
by (xik, vik, vik) where vik is the lower bound and vik the
upper bound reported for bundle xik. We denote the set of
all bundle-value reports of bidder i as Ri; the profile of
all reports is R = (R1, ..., Rn). We say that x ∈ Ri if
∃k : (xik, vik, vik) ∈ Ri ∧ xik = x to simplify the notation.
For convenience and by slight overloading notation, we de-
note by vi(·) and vi(·) the upper and lower reported value
functions for each bidder i respectively; note that these func-
tions have support on Ri only and are elsewhere undefined.
We denote the set of feasible allocation based on reports R
as FR = {a ∈ F : ai ∈ Ri ∀i}.
For our refinement processes, we use linear prices, which
we denote by pi ∈ Rm≥0. Clearing prices are prices such that
demand meets supply, yielding a feasible allocation a with
vi(ai)−pi(ai) ≥ vi(x)−pi(x) ∀i ∈ N, x ∈ X (demand) and
pi(a) ≥ pi(a′) ∀a′ ∈ F (supply). Note that linear clearing
prices may not exist, but if they do, the resulting allocation
a∗ maximizes efficiency (Bikhchandani, Ostroy et al. 2002).
Figure 1: Auction phases of iMLCA compared to MLCA
2.2 MLCA
The ML-powered ICA (MLCA) by Brero, Lubin, and Seuken
(2020) proceeds in three phases:
1. The initialization phase queries random bundles to gener-
ate some input for the ML algorithm.
2. The iterative ML phase, where an ML-powered query
module is used to generate new queries every round.
3. The outcome determination phase, where the outcome (fi-
nal allocation and payments) is computed based solely on
reported bundle-value pairs.
The core of MLCA is an ML-powered query module. This
module uses an ML algorithm to generalize from the bundle-
value pairs that have already been reported by each agent
to learn values for all unreported bundles. It then computes
the efficient allocation at these learned value functions and
queries bidders for their value at this allocation. If the ML
algorithm is accurate, then the queried allocation will be
highly efficient; otherwise the bidder can correct the ML via
the issued query. This way, MLCA proceeds towards a more
efficient outcome, assuming a sufficiently effective ML al-
gorithm and sufficiently truthful bidding.
In general, the ML-powered query module works with
any kind of ML algorithm including NNs (Weissteiner and
Seuken 2020) and SVRs (Brero, Lubin, and Seuken 2020).
Here, we use SVRs as they are effective at learning from the
bounds we receive from the interval queries.
3 ML-powered ICA with Interval Bidding
In this section, we introduce our new ML-powered ICA
with interval bidding (iMLCA). From a practical perspec-
tive, the key difference between MLCA and iMLCA is that
in iMLCA, bidders report upper and lower bounds instead
of exact values. From a design perspective, iMLCA builds
upon the MLCA design and shares some common compo-
nents; but to facilitate interval bidding, significant changes
are necessary. Figure 1 depicts the differences between the
mechanisms. Specifically, iMLCA enhances the ML phase
by adding a bound refinement component that requires bid-
ders to tighten relevant bounds as the auction progresses.
Further, iMLCA includes an entirely new third phase that
forces further narrowing of the bounds to guarantee conver-
gence. The overall iMLCA mechanism is provided in Algo-
rithm 1. The mechanism proceeds as follows:
1. The Initialization phase (Lines 1-3) queries random bun-
dles to generate some input for the ML algorithm.
2. The ML and Bound Refinement phase (Lines 4-11) uses
the ML-powered query module to generate queries and
an activity rule that forces bidders to tighten their bounds.
3. The bound refinement with convergence guarantees phase
(Lines 12-18) continues the refinement by using two ac-
tivity rules until it converges to an efficient allocation.
4. The outcome determination phase computes the final al-
location (Line 19) and payments (Line 20).
Algorithm 1: iMLCA
parameter : max queries Qmax; initial queries Qinit; queries
per round Qround; refinement threshold ωstop;
. Initialization Phase
1 foreach i ∈ I do
2 query Qinit random bundles
3 end
. ML + Bound Refinement Phase
4 while |R1| ≤ Qmax do
5 Compute provisional allocation aα . (Proc. 2)
6 Compute linear prices pi . (Proc. 6)
7 foreach i ∈ I do
8 Query new bundles . (Proc. 3)
9 + MRPAR refinement . (AR. 1)
10 end
11 end
. Bound Refinement with Convergence Guarantees
12 while ωR < ωstop do
13 Compute provisional allocation aα . (Proc. 2)
14 Compute linear prices pi . (Proc. 6)
15 foreach i ∈ I do
16 MRPAR and DIAR refinement . (AR. 1 + 2)
17 end
18 end
. Outcome Determination
19 aiMLCA ∈ arg maxa∈FR
∑
i∈N vi (ai)
20 pi
iMLCA =
∑
j 6=i vj
(
a
(−i)
j
)
−∑j 6=i vj (aj iMLCA)
21 return aiMLCA, piMLCA
Before detailing each of these phases, we formalize the in-
terval queries that we introduce for bidder interaction:
Procedure 1. INTERVAL QUERY
REQUEST: Present bundle x ∈ X to the bidder
RESPONSE: Bidder states (vi, vi)
Interval queries generalize standard value queries, but re-
quire bidders to specify both upper and lower bounds for
a given bundle. This approach is similar to that in the Tree-
Based Bidding Language (Cavallo et al. 2005), but simpler
in that bidders need only specify bounds on only a single
bundle rather than a concisely represented set of bundles.
3.1 Initialization
As in MLCA, this phase elicits reports that are used as ini-
tial training data for the ML algorithm. In contrast to MLCA,
the bidders answer these queries using interval queries. Each
bidder must report values for Qinit bundles selected uni-
formly at random from the complete bundle space.
3.2 Machine Learning and Bound Refinement
As in MLCA, the second phase uses ML to drive elicita-
tion. It invokes the ML-powered query module to identify
new bundles to query from bidders. Unlike MLCA, these
queries are interval queries rather than value queries. Fur-
ther, in iMLCA bidders are not only asked about new bun-
dles in each round, but are also asked to tighten their bounds
on existing bundles in Ri (i.e. that they have already been
queried) according to an activity rule that balances elicita-
tion against bidder effort. These tighter bounds both enable
progress towards finding the efficient allocation and aid the
ML algorithm in making better predictions. The phase also
has a different basic structure from MLCA in that it begins
by constructing a provisional aα, and a set of linear prices
pi that are used to drive the elicitation processes (we defer
specifying these prices to the end of this subsection to ease
the exposition). We detail the key components of this below:
Generating a Provisional Allocation To begin, we select
a provisional allocation that we will use to drive the bound
refinement processes. The allocation is chosen by identify-
ing a value profile that is an affine combination of the exist-
ing upper and lower bounds, as follows:
Procedure 2. GENERATE PROVISIONAL ALLOCATION
(LUBIN ET AL. 2008)
For a chosen α ∈ [0, 1] we compute a provisional valuation
vαi (x) = αvi(x) + (1− α)v(x) ∀i ∈ N, x ∈ Ri
and a provisional allocation
aα ∈ arg maxa∈F
∑
i∈N
vαi (ai).
Generating new Queries For the generation of new
queries we use the ML-powered query module of MLCA
(Brero, Lubin, and Seuken 2020). This module can work
with bound reports when the invoked ML algorithm can do
so. As shown by Brero, Lubin, and Seuken (2018), SVRs
can be formulated to work with bounds, and can thus be
adopted as the ML algorithm in our experiments. However,
any ML-algorithm that is capable of working with bounds
can be used in iMLCA. The queries are issued as follows:
Procedure 3. GENERATE NEW QUERIES
i. Invoke the ML-Powered Query Module to generate 1
query for the main economy.
ii. Invoke the ML-Powered Query Module n − 1 times to
create a query for each marginal economy.
As in MLCA, the procedure issues queries from both the
main and marginal economies to improve the efficacy of
the VCG payment rule that is eventually used. For practi-
cal reasons, we limit the number of reports per bidder to a
constant Qmax. Therefore the number of rounds in the sec-
ond phase where new queries are generated is limited to
(Qmax −Qinit)/Qround.
Bound Refinement In addition to querying new bundles,
in each round of the phase, we also require bidders to tighten
their bounds on all bundles (both new and existing) accord-
ing to an activity rule, specifically the MRPAR rule:
Activity Rule 1. MODIFIED REVEALED PREFERENCE AC-
TIVITY RULE (MRPAR) (LUBIN ET AL. 2008):
Given the provisional allocation aα, linear prices pi, and ex-
isting reportsRi, any given bidder imust submit reports con-
sistent with following rule:
∃xˇi ∈ Ris.t. vi(xˇi)−pi(xˇi) ≥ vi(xi)−pi(xi)∀xi ∈ Ri\{xˇi}
and either xˇi = aαi or vi(xˇi)− pi(xˇi) > vi(aαi )− pi(aαi )
In words, the MRPAR rule requires bidders to reveal that a
particular bundle xˇi is preferred to all others at the current
prices pi; this preference may be weak if xˇi is the bidder’s
provisional allocation aαi and must be strict otherwise. If the
bidder fails to meet the rule, his bids are frozen from that
point forward. MRPAR is based on the principle of revealed
preference (see Ausubel and Baranov (2017) for a thorough
treatment of the desirable properties of such activity rules).
As shown in Lubin et al. (2008), if all bidders indicate that
aαi is their preferred bundle, the refinement has converged
and the prices pi will be clearing prices; this highlights the
importance of choosing a good price vector pi.
Generating Linear Prices We now introduce a new al-
gorithm to determine linear prices pi that speeds up con-
vergence. We start from existing techniques for producing
approximate clearing prices and then add a twist. As linear
clearing prices may not exist in a CA setting, we start with
a general procedure to generate approximate linear clearing
prices for a given allocation aα and a given reported valua-
tion profile vˆ, which is inspired by Kwasnica et al. (2005):
Procedure 4. δ-APPROXIMATE CLEARING PRICES
Solve a sequence of linear programs to find pi. First:
δ = min max
i,k
δik (1)
s.t. vˆi(a
α
i )−pi(aαi )+δik ≥ vˆi(xik)−pi(xik)∀i, k (2)
pij = 0 ∀j ∈M : @i ∈ N : aαij = 1 (3)
Where δik measures violation of the clearing condition for
the kth report of bidder i. Thus the overall maximal negative
utility of any bidder given prices pi is δ. Next solve:
min|{δik : δik > 0}| (4)
s.t. (2) and (3) (5)
δik ≤ δ ∀i, k (6)
which breaks ties to minimize the number of positive δik.
Procedure 4 produces approximate clearing prices, but
these may still not be unique. To fix this, we further break
ties as follows:
Procedure 5. GENERATE UNIQUE PRICES
i. Invoke Procedure 4 with vˆ = vα, and let δαij be the result-
ing required approximation.
ii. Solve the quadratic program: Minimize ||δαik||2, subject to
(2), (3), (6) and δik ≤ 0∀δik that were ≤ 0 in Step i..
iii. Solve a new program where the objective in step ii. be-
comes a constraint and we maximize the sum of the prices.
To introduce our innovation on this procedure, we first
need the following:
Definition 1 (Perturbed Valuation (Lubin et al. 2008)). The
perturbed valuation, denoted ◦v, with respect to a given allo-
cation a is given by:
◦
vi(x) =
{
vi(x) if x = ai
vi(x) otherwise
(7)
While Procedure 5 produces unique prices, we can do bet-
ter by targeting a price vector that specifically reduces the
number of bundles a bidder must consider in MRPAR:
Procedure 6. GENERATE EFFORT REDUCTION PRICES
i. Invoke step i. and ii. from Procedure 5 .
ii. Invoke Procedure 4 with vˆ = ◦v while keeping constraints
generated in step i. active; let
◦
δik be resulting deltas.
iii. Solve the quadratic program: Minimize ||◦δik+C||2, where
C is a large constant, and holding all constraints active.
iv. Maximize prices per Step iii. from Procedure 5
3.3 Bound Refinement with Convergence
Guarantees.
There is no guarantee that bounds are tight enough to deter-
mine the efficient allocation after the previous phase. This
might be due to two reasons. First, the Activity Rule 1 (MR-
PAR) from the previous phase does not guarantee conver-
gence; second, new reports are added in every round which
might also compromise convergence.
The purpose of this additional refinement phase is there-
fore to guarantee convergence. In each round of this phase,
bidders are asked to refine bounds according to two activ-
ity rules. In addition to Activity Rule 1 (MRPAR) we now
also enforce Activity Rule 2 (DIAR) that guarantees conver-
gence:
Activity Rule 2. DELTA IMPROVEMENT ACTIVITY RULE
(DIAR) (LUBIN ET AL. 2008):
DIAR is based on the DIAR-Error δik of each report for bun-
dle xik which can be interpreted as the maximal pricing error
of this report and is defined as:
δ
k
i =
◦
v(xik)− pi(xik)− (◦v(aαi )− pi(aαi ))
Given some parameter  and all reports of bidder i ordered
such that δ
k
i ≥ δk+1i , bidder i must refine his bids such that
1 a) reduce δ
k
i by at least  for any k and
b) show ∀p < k : δpi can not be reduced or
2 show ∀p : δpi can not be reduced
Refinement in the mechanism will converge as DIAR’s
 → 0 because the all bid’s interval will be smaller than 
in the limit. To verify if the refinement has converged, we
define a convergence bound ωR = v(a)/
◦
v(
◦
a) ≤ 1 (Lubin
et al. 2008), and stop the refinement if a threshold ωstop is
reached. We use the ◦v with respect to a, which measures
the maximal surplus for bidder i achievable by changing a
bidder’s allocation from ai to any other x ∈ Ri \ ai, where
the ◦a is the allocation that maximizes ◦v(a). Furthermore, we
limit the maximal number of refinement rounds to keep the
total number of rounds reasonable.
3.4 Outcome Determination
When determining the outcome, we take a conservative ap-
proach by using the lower bound valuation v. This guaran-
tees that we never take a value into account that is higher
than a bidder’s true value (if bidders bid truthfully). Finally,
we also use v to compute VCG-style payments.
4 Theoretical Analysis
In this section we present a theoretical analysis of iMLCA.
4.1 Individual Rationality
A mechanism satisfies individual rationality if no bidder ob-
tains negative utility, i.e., ∀i : ui(ai, pi) ≥ 0.
Proposition 1. iMLCA satisfies individual rationality.
Proof. For all bidders i we have vi
(
aiMLCA
) − piiMLCA =
v
(
aiMLCA
) −∑j 6=i vj (a(−i)j ) ≥ 0 because a(−i)j ∈ FR
and v
(
aiMLCA
)
= maxa∈FR v (a).
4.2 No Deficit
A mechanism satisfies no deficit if the sum of all payments
is not negative. For iMLCA this is straightforward to show
as we do not have negative payments.
Proposition 2. iMLCA satisfies no deficit.
Proof. For all bidders i we have piiMLCA =∑
j 6=i
(
vj
(
a
(−i)
j
)
− vj(aj iMLCA)
)
≥ 0 because aiMLCA ∈
FR and
∑
j 6=i vi(a
(−i)
j ) = maxa∈FR
∑
j 6=i vi(a).
4.3 Incentives
Brero, Lubin, and Seuken (2020) provide an incentive anal-
ysis of MLCA and argue that it provides good incentives for
bidders to report truthfully. Their main arguments translate
straightforwardly to iMLCA.
First, they allow bidders to (optionally) submit push bids,
i.e., unsolicited bundle-value pairs. This feature mitigates
certain strategic manipulation opportunities. It is straightfor-
ward to include push bids (with intervals) in iMLCA, such
that the same benefit in terms of incentives applies.
Second, MLCA explicitly queries the marginal
economies. Brero, Lubin, and Seuken (2020) argued
that this is important to mitigate manipulations of the VCG-
style payments. As iMLCA also queries the marginals,
again the same benefit in terms of incentives applies.
These arguments not withstanding, we note that the bid-
ders’ strategy space in iMLCA is larger than in MLCA due
to the interval queries and the refinement processes. While
so far, we could not identify how a bidder might exploit this
additional freedom to his benefit, we leave a formal analysis
of the incentive properties of iMLCA to future work.
4.4 Bidder Effort Reduction
The following proposition shows that our new price-based
refinement (Procedure 6) weakly reduces the number of bun-
dles a bidder must consider during an MRPAR refinement.
Proposition 3. Bidder i can ignore all bundles xik ∈
Ri \ {aαi } with
◦
δik ≤ 0 during an MRPAR refinement.
Proof. For any bundle xik 6= aαi with
◦
δik ≤ 0 we have
vi(a
α
i )− pi(aαi ) ≥ vi(xik)− pi(xik) (8)
before the refinement. According to MRPAR and inequality
(8) bidder i must report any xˇi 6= xik with
vi(xˇi)− pi(xˇi) ≥ v(aαi )− pi(aαi ) ≥ vi(xik)− pi(xik) (9)
but inequality (8) holds already before the refinement.
5 Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the performance of iMLCA by
comparing it against the original MLCA and the CCA.
5.1 Experiment Set-Up
Domains. For our experiments, we use the spectrum auc-
tion test suite (SATS) version 0.7.0. (Weiss, Lubin, and
Seuken 2017). SATS enables us to generate thousands of
synthetic auction instances on demand, providing access to
bidders’ values, and allowing us to quickly compute the true
efficient allocation. We use the following three domains:
Global Synergy Value Model (GSVM) (Goeree and Holt
2010): A relatively simple medium-sized domain with 18
items and 7 bidders of different types.
Local Synergy Value Model (LSVM) (Scheffel, Ziegler, and
Bichler 2012): A medium-sized domain with 18 items and
6 bidders of different types. Synergies arise from the prox-
imity of items, which makes LSVM more complex.
Multi-Region Value Model (MRVM) (Weiss, Lubin, and
Seuken 2017): A large-sized domain with 98 items and
10 bidders of different types. It is the most complex
domain we consider, modeled after large Candian CAs.
Modeling Bidder Behavior. When simulating bidders’
responses to queries in our experiments, we let bidders be-
have consistently with their true preferences. Thus, for every
bidder i and every bundle x on which the bidder has made
an interval report, it must hold that: vi(x) ≤ vi(x) ≤ vi(x).
Note that for our experiments, we do not want the reported
intervals [vi(x), vi(x)] to always be centered around the
true value vi(x). To this end, We simulate the interval re-
ports following the same approach as Brero, Lubin, and
Mechanism Efficiency Revenue Rounds
iMLCA 99.9% (0.03) 56.6% (1.32) 23
MLCA 100.0% (0.00) 68.4% (1.11) 18
CCA 100.0% (0.00) 68.1% (1.13) 234
Table 1: Results for GSVM with query cap Qmax = 100.
Standard errors in parentheses. Averages over 100 instances.
Seuken (2018): For any given bundle x and bidder i, we
independently draw two error measures z1 and z2 from a
standard normal distribution with mean 0 and standard de-
viation µvi(x), where µ is a parameter capturing the bid-
ders’ reporting uncertainty. The lower and upper bounds are
then obtained as vi(x) = max(0, vi(x) − z1) and vi(x) =
vi(x)+z2, respectively. In our experiments, we use µ = 0.5.
To provide some intuition: with µ = 0.5, a typical interval
report looks like [100, 000; 200, 000], which obviously cor-
responds to a large amount of uncertainty. To simulate the
process by which bidders tighten their bounds, we imple-
mented two straightforward heuristics that adjusts bounds
according to MRPAR and DIAR, respectively. For details,
please see the technical appendix.
Mechanism Set-Up. For iMLCA, we use the same param-
eters as were used by Brero, Lubin, and Seuken (2020) for
MLCA (including the SVR parametrization) with one ex-
ception: we re-tuned the number of initial queries Qinit for
GSVM and LSVM via a grid search in [10, 90], which re-
sulted in Qinit = 50 for both domains. We set the refinement
threshold ωstop = 0.99 and use a maximum of 30 refinement
rounds to keep the total number of rounds reasonable. The
refinement parameters α and  are obtained as described in
Lubin et al. (2008). To solve all optimization problems, we
use CPLEX (version 12.10) with a timeout of 60 seconds
in iMLCA (excluding the final allocation); we use the best
sub-optimal solution found in case the time limit is reached.1
We will make the source code for iMLCA available under a
open-source license upon acceptance of this paper.
5.2 Experimental Efficiency
We now compare the efficiency of iMLCA, MLCA and CCA
in all three domains.2 For all results, we use a one-way
ANOVA to test for statistically significant differences be-
tween all three mechanisms, and we use a post-hoc compar-
ison using the Tukey test for further pairwise comparisons.3
We start with GSVM (see Table 1). Due to the simplicity
of GSVM, we use a small query cap of Qmax = 100. For
efficiency, we find a small statistically significant difference
(iMLCA is less efficient than CCA and MLCA; p < 0.05
1We ran each experiment on a Ubuntu 16.04 cluster with AMD
EPYC 7702 2.0 GHz processors using 8 cores and 32 GB of RAM.
2To enable a head-to-head comparision, we use the same setting
seeds (for the test set) as used by Brero, Lubin, and Seuken (2020),
which are seeds 101 − 200 for the results based on 100 instances,
and seeds 101− 150 for thosed based on 50 instances.
3We thank the authors of Brero, Lubin, and Seuken (2020)
for providing us with the detailed results of their experiments for
MLCA and CCA to enable these statistical tests.
Mechanism Efficiency Revenue Rounds
iMLCA 99.6% (0.09) 73.2% (1.09) 127
MLCA 99.7% (0.09) 80.9% (0.89) 111
CCA 99.9% (0.03) 82.3% (0.91) 124
Table 2: Results for LSVM with query cap Qmax = 500.
Standard errors in parentheses. Averages over 100 instances.
in both cases). However, given that even iMLCA achieves
99.9% efficiency, for all practical purposes, the three mech-
anisms can be considered to perform equally well.
Next, we consider LSVM (see Table 2). Given that LSVM
is more complex and more difficult to learn with quadratic
kernels (see Brero, Lubin, and Seuken (2020)), we here
use a query cap of Qmax = 500. For efficiency, we find a
statistically significant difference between all three mech-
anisms (p < 0.05). Further analysis shows that the CCA
performs better than iMLCA (p < 0.05). However, iMLCA
and MLCA do not perform statistically significantly differ-
ent (p = 0.63). Furthermore, the difference between MLCA
and CCA is also not statistically significant (p = 0.15).
Finally, we consider MRVM (see Table 3). As MRVM
was modeled based on the 2014 Canadian auction, we use
the same query cap Qmax = 500 as used in practice (Indus-
try Canada 2013). In terms of efficiency, we find a statis-
tically significant difference between all three mechanism-
swe (p < 0.001). While iMLCA achieves a lower efficiency
than MLCA (p < 0.05), we most importantly find that the
efficiency of CCA is lower than the efficiency of iMLCA
(p < 0.05) and of MLCA (p = 0.001).
Summarizing our efficiency experiments, we conclude
that iMLCA achieves almost the same efficiency as MLCA,
even though it operates with interval queries instead of exact
queries. Importantly, iMLCA achieves a 1% point higher ef-
ficiency than the CCA in the realistic-sized MRVM domain.
5.3 Evaluating Reported Uncertainty
We now take a closer look at the main selling point of
iMLCA: the fact that it does not require bidders to report
exact values (which may be very costly), but allows them
to remain relatively uncertain about their own valuations. To
capture this, we measure the reporting uncertainty of an in-
terval report (xik, vik, vik) as (vik − vik)/vik. In Table 4,
we compare MLCA and iMLCA in terms of the initial and
final uncertainty (averaged over the reported bundles). These
results highlight that iMLCA, despite iteratively asking bid-
ders to refine their bounds, allows bidders to maintain a high
degree of uncertainty on their reported values.
Mechanism Efficiency Revenue Rounds
iMLCA 95.2% (0.25) 23.9% (0.76) 123
MLCA 96.1% (0.20) 35.3% (0.51) 114
CCA 94.2% (0.20) 30.0% (0.77) 141
Table 3: Results for MRVM with query cap Qmax = 500.
Standard errors in parentheses. Averages over 50 instances.
Mechanism Domain UncertaintyInitial Final
iMLCA
GSVM 55% 47%
LSVM 55% 50%
MRVM 55% 41%
MLCA all domains 0% 0 %
Table 4: Comparison of bidders’ reporting uncertainty
5.4 Effect of new Price Generation Objective
We now analyze by how much our new price-based refine-
ment process (Procedure 6) improves the performance of
iMLCA. To this end, we consider the MRVM domain and
compare iMLCA to a version of iMLCA where we only use
the simple price generation Procedure 5 (iMLCA-SP). Ta-
ble 5 (provided in the technical appendix) shows that our
new price generation objective reduces bidder effort in terms
of MRPAR refinements (p < 0.001) and in terms of the total
number of refinements per bidder (p < 0.001).
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a new ML-powered ICA
with interval bidding (iMLCA), which allows bidders to ex-
press uncertainty about their values. Our experiments have
demonstrated that iMLCA achieves almost the same effi-
ciency as MLCA, and even outperforms the CCA in the
realistically-sized MRVM domain. This suggests iMLCA as
a practical mechanism to conduct large ICAs.
On a technical level, our main contribution was the careful
integration of a price-based refinement process with an ML-
powered query module in one auction phase. Furthermore,
we have designed a new price generation objective and we
have shown that it reduces bidder effort.
There are multiple avenues for future work. For exam-
ple, one could interleave phases 2 and 3 of iMLCA, which
leads to tighter bounds earlier in the auction and may help
the ML-powered query module make better predictions. An-
other direction for future work is to adapt iMLCA to other
ML techniques (e.g., using deep neural networks) or to ex-
plore using non-linear prices to drive the refinement process.
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Appendix
A Additional Data Table
Table 5 shows the effect of the new price generation objec-
tive (Section 5.4).
iMLCA iMLCA-SP
Efficiency 95.2% (0.25) 94.8% (0.22)
Rounds 123 (1.5) 127 (1.5)
# MRPAR Refinements 27.8 (0.56) 36.6 (0.32)
Total # of Refinements 1131 (37.5) 1348.8 (37.0)
Table 5: Results for MRVM with query cap of Qmax = 500.
Standard errors in parentheses. Averages over 50 instances.
B Modeling Bidder Behavior - Refinement
We implemented two straightforward heuristics that adjust
bounds according to MRPAR and DIAR, respectively. We
first run the MRPAR heuristic (Algorithm 2) followed by the
DIAR heuristic (Algorithm 3). Both heuristics rely on the
assumption that it might be hard for a bidder to determine his
exact value and therefore a bidder rather chooses to tighten
bounds that are further away from his true value. In both
heuristics, we aim to minimize the amount of refinement,
such that bidders only refine the bounds as much as is needed
to comply with the activity rules.
Algorithm 2: MRPAR Heuristic
parameter : provisional allocation aα; linear prices pi; Ri
the reports of bidder i
. Identify xˆ the bundle with the highest utility
. Break ties in favour of aαi
1 xˆ ∈ arg maxx∈Ri vi(x)− pi(x)
. Identify ˆˆx the bundle with the second highest
utility
2 ˆˆx ∈ arg maxx∈Ri\{xˆ} vi(x)− pi(x)
. Draw a break point utility uˆ
. D(x,y) is a (capped) bell-shaped distribution which
draws random from the range [x,y]
3 uˆ ∼ D(vi(ˆˆx)− pi(ˆˆx), vi(xˆ)− pi(xˆ)
. Make sure refinement bounds are not tightened more
than needed
4 if maxx∈Ri\{xˆ} vi(x)− pi(x) < uˆ then
5 uˆ = maxx∈Ri\{xˆ} vi(x)− pi(x)
6 if uˆ < vi(xˆ)− pi(xˆ) then
7 uˆ = vi(xˆ)− pi(xˆ)
. Make sure strict inequality is met in case xˆ 6= aαi
8 η = 0
9 if xˆ 6= aαi and vi(xˆ)− pi(xˆ) ≤ maxx∈Ri\{xˆ} vi(x)− pi(x)
then
10 set η to a very small number
. Adjust bounds
11 vi(xˆ) = min{vi(xˆ), uˆ+ pi(xˆ) + η}
}
12 foreach x ∈ Ri \ {xˆ} do
v1i (x) = max
{
vi(x),min{vsi (x), uˆ+ pi(x)− η}
}
13 return Ri
Algorithm 3: DIAR Heuristic
parameter : provisional allocation aα; linear prices pi; Ri
the reports of bidder i ordered according to the
DIAR error δi;  of the DIAR rule.
1 foreach xik ∈ Ri do
2 if δki was already by  in the MRPAR heuristic then
3 break
4 if δki can be reduced by  then
. Bounds are tightened only as much as needed.
Which bound is tightened by which amount is
drawn from a capped bell-shaped random
distribution.
5 Reduce δ
k
i by 
6 break
. Bounds are tightened only as much as needed.
Which bound is tightened by which amount is
drawn from a capped bell-shaped random
distribution.
7 show that δki can not be reduced
8 end
9 return Ri
